Right to Counsel by Eitzen, Lawrence O.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decisions the Supreme Court has required many
fundamental changes in our system of criminal justice. The Court
has placed particular emphasis upon expanding protections for the
indigent as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and the Bill
of Rights. One of the most significant areas in which protection
has been extended is that of appointed counsel for those who cannot
afford retained counsel.
Historically the Court has distinguished between a right to
retained counsel, which is guaranteed in most confrontations with
the state in our criminal system, and a right to appointed counsel,
which has been circumscribed.' But recent decisions concerning the
right to counsel have significantly reduced the importance of this
distinction by increasing the opportunity for appointed counsel.
The Court's present position on the right to appointed counsel
can be briefly summarized: an impoverished suspect who has been
taken into police custody must be told of his right to have counsel
appointed before the police may subject him to interrogation. 2 If
the police decide not to interrogate, an indigent has a right to have
counsel at the first critical stage in the criminal proceedings, 8 and,
if he does not wish to exercise that right, he must intelligently
and understandingly waive it.4 If the indigent should be convicted,
he has a right to request and obtain counsel for his first direct
appeal; 5 even if that appeal appears frivolous, appointed counsel
must submit a brief to the appellate court arguing all possible
meritorious points of petitioner's appeal.0 This is the minimum
degree of constitutional protection beneath which the state cannot
go in administering its system of criminal justice.
But the full extension of the guaranty of appointed counsel
has not been delineated and the boundaries of its scope are not ap-
parent. Where does the right to counsel attach-what is a "critical
stage?" Does the right to counsel extend to appeals to the state
supreme court, to writs of certiorari to the United States Supreme
1 See Reynolds v. Cochran, 565 U.S. 525, 550-31 (1961); Chandler v. Fretag, 348
U.S. 3, 9 (1954).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
3 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961).
4 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1962).
5 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
6 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
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Court? Does a person charged with a misdemeanor have the same
right to counsel as a person charged with a felony? What about col-
lateral attacks on other quasi-criminal suits? Does an indigent have
the right to appointed counsel in a purely civil proceeding in which
the state is a party? Could he have this right in a purely civil pro-
ceeding in which the state takes no part?7
II. Ex=ST Nac OF THE RIGHT
On March 18, 1963, The Supreme Court handed down Gideon
v. Wainwright" and Douglas v. California.9 Gideon completed the
erosion of Betts v. Brady0 by providing a right to appointed counsel
at trial for all defendants-at least in felony cases. The Court based
its decision on the incorporation of the sixth amendment into the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. But the Court
did not limit its language to incorporation alone; the decision
contains the following statement:
[Any] person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him.... [D]efendants who have the money hire lawyers....
From the very beginning, our state and national constitution
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substan-
tive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before im-
partial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law. This noble idea cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer
to assist him.1'
The Court seems to be saying that since a man with means can
have counsel, a poor man can have counsel-because counsel is a
necessary safeguard to the achievement of our goal of fair trials.
The Court's reasoning is thus an amalgam of due process and equal
protection.
In Douglas the right to counsel was expanded in language
which could extend to all cases of appeals as of right. The court
based its decision on a finding of a denial of equal protection:
7 See generally Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MiNm. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1963).
8 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
9 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
30 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which had held that the totality of the circumstances deter-
mined whether a right to counsel existed at the trial level. Among the factors the Court
considered important were the intellectual qualifications of the defendant and the
complexity of the case. Id. at 472.
11 372 U.S. at 344.
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There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys
the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of
the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the
indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination
that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself.12
But it also contained the following due process language:
When an indigent is forced to run this gantlet of a prelimi-
nary showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport
with fair procedure.13
Thus a convincing argument can be made that in neither case does
the court rest its outcome exclusively on one doctrine.
If Douglas were based solely on due process the paradoxical
result would be for due process to require the appointment of
counsel on appeal even though it does not require the state to
provide an appellate system. 14 This may well be the underlying
reason Douglas was decided on predominantly equal protection
grounds.' 5 Justice Harlan in his dissent discards equal protection
as a basis for the Court's decision and, after recognizing that previous
decisions hold that due process does not require the States to offer
an appeal, concludes that the real question is "whether the state's
rules with respect to the appointment of counsel are so arbitrary or
unreasonable ... as to require their invalidation." 6 Justice Harlan
is thus applying the due process test which the Court applies to
substantive legislation. Since 1937 the Court has been very hesitant
to use the substantive due process test to find legislation unconsti-
tutional. 7 Clearly, given the premise that procedural due process
does not require the state to provide an appeal, if a constitutional
right to counsel on appeal had to be based on due process, it would
not be based on sturdy grounds. But the right to counsel on appeal
is not based solely on due process; rather on a combination of equal
protection and due process.
12 372 U.S. at 357-58.
13 Id. at 357.
14 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
15 This reasoning also applies to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16 372 U.S. at 365.
17 In one of the early cases applying the "modern" substantive due process test,
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US. 379 (1937), the Court upheld a state minimum
wage requirement for women stating:
Legislative response to that conviction [that a minimum wage is necessary]
cannot be regarded as arbitrary or capricious, and that is all we have to deide.
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Griffin v. Illinois18 and Douglas mark a chance in the Court's
application of equal protection. In the normal equal protection
case, prior to Griffin, the Court would search for a state policy of
discrimination against a certain class bearing no reasonable rela-
Even if the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable and its effects
uncertain, still the legislature is entitled to its judgment. Id. at 399 (emphasis
added).
In a line of cases dealing predominantly in matters of economic regulation the Court
has declared that it will not apply the due process clause to sit in judgment of the
wisdom of legislation but will very narrowly construe the limitations imposed upon
the states' police power by the due process clause and very rarely overturn its exercise.
See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952); Lincoln Fed.
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 US. 525, 536-37 (1949); Olsen v.
Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n., 313 U.S. 236, 246.47 (1941).
But the Court has made it dear that due process is one thing when applied to
economic legislation and quite another when applied to questions involving individual
freedom; the Court is much more willing to find state legislation unconstitutional where
there is an infringement upon individual freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US.
398 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US. 296, 303 (1940).
A reason generally given for the sharp distinction is that in the latter case judicial
discretion is limited to determining whether a specific guaranty contained within the
Bill of Rights and incorporated by the due process clause has been violated, whereas in
the former the Court, because it has no specific standards, is in danger of sitting as a
super-legislature. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), weakens this explanation
because the Court may have used due process to overturn state legislation infringing
individual freedom without incorporating specific amendments of the Bill of Rights
into the due process test. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) & 499-502 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). See Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 81 HAv. L. Rxv. 435, 439 (1967). But see Justice Douglas' opinion, 381 US. at
484-85. Griswold (and all of the problems in interpreting it) aside, the Court has not
been quick to venture outside the Bill of Rights in declaring legislation unconstitu-
tional as violative of the substantive due process test. Therefore Justice Stone's foot-
note may still be an accurate explanation for the Court's decision:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). See also St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 77 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring, makes
a distinction between the due process rule applied to property and the due process rule
applied to liberty). If, therefore, it is true that a substantive due process test is now
limited to incorporation (whether selective or complete) of the Bill of Rights or the
"arbitrary or capricious" test of West Coast v. Parrish, then Douglas, given the Court's
position that an appeal is not required by the fourteenth amendment, could not have
been decided on a pure due process ground.
I8 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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tion to a legitimate state purpose.19 The Court might find the dis-
crimination spelled out in the legislation on its face 0 or implicit in
the state's method of administration,21 but the Court would not
find a violation of equal protection in the absence of an affirmative
state policy of discrimination. In Douglas the Court finds an in-
vidious discrimination by the state against the poor because the
state had failed to furnish counsel in a legal proceeding instigated
by the state for which counsel was necessary. The Court has thus
shifted its focus from an examination of state policy to an examina-
tion of the realistic consequences of state action. Thus under the
Griffin and Douglas approach the Court need only find a causal con-
nection between the state action and resulting discrimination to find
a violation of the equal protection clause. The end result of this
reasoning is to create an affirmative duty on the part of the state to
remove the cause of the discriminatory consequences. 22 The end result
of a "pure" equal protection reasoning could be to find an affirmative
duty on the part of the state to remove completely the effects of pov-
erty in a criminal proceeding. 23 The equal protection test would
then be very simple and easy to apply-whenever lack of resources
places a burden upon the defendant to his detriment in a criminal
proceeding, the state must remove that burden and put him in
the same position as a man with resources. The problem with this
test is, of course, that it says too much by saying too little. It puts
no express limitations upon the reach of its application.24
However if Douglas is based on an underlying principle that
fairness demands equality because counsel is absolutely necessary
to achieve an adequate appellate review,25 a due process element
is introduced. Two possible conclusions can be drawn about the
equal protection doctrine: either due process and equal protection
are so commingled that what equal protection demands due process
also demands, or the equal protection doctrine is based upon a
19 The Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARv. L. REv. 83, 126-27 (1956).
20 E.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
21 E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
22 Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Forward: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91-93 (1966).
23 Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
HAIv. L. Rv. 435, 436 (1967).
24 Note, Right to Aid in Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants,
47 MINN. L. REv. 1054, 1070 (1963).
25 Wilcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment,
43 Coi .LL L.Q. 1, 15 (1957); cf. 47 MINN. L. REV. at 1072.
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preliminary finding that an interest is important enough that in
pursuit of fairness it should be protected by the equal protection
clause. Griffin's statement that due process does not require appel-
late review26 would seem to exclude the possibility that what is
demanded by equal protection is also always required by due
process. Therefore only the latter conclusion remains: the Court
must evaluate the importance of an interest to determine whether
equal protection should be applied.
If Douglas is saying simply that because a rich man can obtain
counsel a poor man should be placed in a similar position, an eval-
uation of the underlying interest, viz., a right to counsel on the first
appeal of right, would not be necessary. But Douglas does not say
that. Douglas says that a rich man can obtain counsel to review
the record, to research the law and to present arguments.2 Thus
Douglas is based on two steps: one, that a rich man will have
counsel, and two, that counsel is necessary to present an adequate
appeal. The latter appeals to our due process instincts and requires
an evaluation of the importance of the interest the poor man is
claiming. In short, the equal protection test as developed in Douglas
requires the Court to examine the consequences of its criminal
procedure to determine (1) whether a man without funds is denied
an "interest" afforded a man with means and (2) whether that in-
terest is significant enough to be deserving of equal protection.
In evaluating the significance of a particular interest the Court
can profit from its experience with due process. Evaluation prob-
ably should be accomplished by some type of a balancing test weigh-
ing the importance to the individual of the interest under adjudica-
tion against the importance to the state of retaining the status quo.s
Clearly then the concept of due process is intertwined with the equal
protection doctrine..2 9 But equal protection seems to reach areas
where due process will not reach by protecting lesser interests than
those protected by due process.3 0 Griffin and Douglas, since due
process does not require an appeal, are examples of this.
28 351 US. 12, 18 (1956).
27 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
28 See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YAiE Lj. 319, 350-52 (1957).
29 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 US. 497, 499 (1954); Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case
-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 ComrLL L.Q. 1, 11 (1957).
SO Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 435, 438-39 (1967).
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III. EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT
The remainder of this note will be devoted to an examination
of the extension of the right to counsel in three areas: at what point
prior to trial counsel should be appointed; how long after trial
this representation should continue; and to which offenders the
right to counsel should attach.
A. Prior to Trial
In 1934 Dean Justin Miller wrote:
The time when an accused person really needs the help of the
lawyer is when he is first arrested and from then on until trial.
The intervening period is so full of hazards for the accused
person that he may have lost any legitimate defense long before
he is arraigned and put on trial.8 '
Many of the hazards with which Dean Miller was concerned have
been removed, at least theoretically, by Miranda v. Arizona,82 which
requires the police to advise an accused of his right to remain silent,
to warn him that anything he says can be used against him, and
to offer appointed counsel to an indigent before beginning custo-
dial investigation. The spirit of Miranda would seem to indicate
that the right to counsel begins at the first significant contact with
the police.3 3 However, the decision was based upon the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Where there is no inter-
rogation, the right to appointed counsel may not attach under the
Miranda rationale in pre-trial proceedings which present no danger
of self-incrimination. Miranda may have so decreased the effec-
tiveness and practicality of interrogation that the police will use
it only infrequently. The question of when the right to counsel
attaches therefore remains significant.
Prior to trial an accused may be subject to several proceedings
in which there is little danger of self-incrimination but which
may affect the future development of the case. The pre-trial proceed-
ings differ in every state; in a "typical" jurisdiction the following
will occur: Shortly after arrest for a felony the suspect will be
31 Miller, Lawyers and the Admn. of Criminal Justice, 20 A.B.A.J. 77, 78 (1934).
See also A. WOOD, CRIMINAL LAWYER 197-202 (1967) which suggests counsel must be
made available at arrest by an extension of legal aid societies.
32 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33 But see Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona,
67 CoLum. L. REv. 645, 665 (1967) which emphasizes Miranda's failure to put much
reliance on the sixth amendment right to counsel, and Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1 (1968),
which allows stop and frisk.
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brought before a magistrate" at what is called a preliminary hearing.
The magistrate determines whether the prosecution has sufficient
evidence for maintaining a criminal proceeding. If the magistrate
finds sufficient evidence, he will bind the suspect over for further
proceedings35-for either a grand jury hearing or directly to trial.
If the case goes to the grand jury, it will investigate to find a "true"
indictment.3 6 Shortly prior to trial there will be an arraignment
before the trial court at which the suspect is informed of the charges
against him and asked to plead.3 7 The preceding legal steps provide
notice and hearings for the accused and serve as checks on the
arbitrary exercise of power by the police.
Certainly the presence of counsel at any of these stages would
aid in obtaining these goals. It is conceivable that counsel could be
appointed upon arrest of a suspect or shortly thereafter in the
station house. Appointment at one of these points would provide
the most effective protection for an individual, but in many juris-
dictions may not be feasible at present. Appointment of counsel
at the arraignment is certainly feasible, but the arraignment may
precede the trial by several minutes or several months. 5 Thus,
appointment of counsel at this stage may not be early enough to
allow counsel to perform his function adequately. Appointment of
counsel at the preliminary hearing may be an acceptable compro-
mise between the rights of an individual and the demands of the
state; for, at the preliminary hearing, it would be administratively
feasible for the state to provide representation.
The preliminary hearing serves several important functions:
notice to the accused of the charges brought against him, an early
stage of discovery, the first opportunity to defend, as well as (in many
jurisdictions) the first chance for release on bail. Basically the prelimi-
nary hearing allows a judicial officer to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe a felony has been committed and the accused
is guilty of committing it. If the judicial officer finds unfavorably for
34 L. ORFiLw, CRimiNAL PROCEDURE FROM ARums TO APEAL 49.50 (1947) [herein.
after cited as OarE-].
35 Oari= 67-68.
36 OanLu, 157.
37 OasmL 273. It should be noted, however, that in some jurisdictions the prose-
cutor's information can take the place of the preliminary hearing and the grand jury
hearing, and in some jurisdictions the grand jury hearing can take the place of the
preliminary hearing. D. KARLEN, ANGLO-A.aUEcAN CawN AL Jus'ncz 143, 149-50 (1967).
38 KARuzN, supra note 37, at 178.
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the accused, he will bind him over for further proceedings;80 if
the prosecutor cannot show probable cause that the accused com-
mitted the felony, the judicial officer will discharge the accused.
To show probable cause, the prosecutor must present some evidence
of his case; and the accused is then able to cross-examine the pro-
secutor's witnesses.40 The accused may present his own witnesses to
refute probable cause.41 In many jurisdictions, as a protection for
the accused, he need neither assert a plea nor raise any defenses. 42
The preliminary hearing thus operates primarily for the benefit
of the accused because, if probable cause is not shown, he will be
spared further proceedings. 43
Under current Supreme Court law, representation must be
given a defendant if the pre-trial hearing is a critical stage of the
proceeding. 44 Powell v. Alabama, a forerunner of the critical stage
test, said:
[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings
against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their
arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consulta-
tion, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally
important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in
any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid
during that period as at the trial itself 45
Powell recognized the importance of counsel prior to trial. Two
recent Supreme Court cases demanded the presence of counsel before
trial. In Hamilton v. Alabama" the Court had to decide if arraign-
ment was a critical stage. The Court found that the arraignment
was a critical stage because under Alabama procedure certain pleas
30 See United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1964);
Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 543, 207 A.2d 83, 94 (1965); OarIELD at 67.
40 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Harris v. Wilson, 239 F. Supp. 204, 210
(N.D. Cal. 1965); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-76a (1958).
41 State ex rel. Hanagan v. Armijo, 72 N.M. 50, 53-54, 380 P.2d 196, 198.99 (1963),
People v. White, 18 Misc. 2d 56, 58, 188 N.Y.S.2d 585, 588 (Orange County Ct. 1959):
ARx. STAT. ANN. § 43-624 (1964).
42 Wells v. California, 234 F. Supp. 467, 470 (S.D. Cal. 1964); People v. Morris, 30
Ill. 2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964); People v. Givans, 83 Ill. App. 2d 423, 228 N.E.2d 123
(1967); State v. Wilson, 22 Conn. Supp. 345, 172 A.2d 902 (App. Div. 1961).
43 State v. Minamyer, 12 Ohio St. 2d 67, 232 N.E.2d 401 (1967); W. LAFAvE, ARM sT,
Tm DECIsION To TAKE A SUSPECr INTO CUSTODY 321 (F. Remington ed. 1965); Note, The
Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IowA L. Rnv. 164-65 (1965).
44 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
45 287 US. 45, 57 (1932) (emphasis added).
46 368 US. 52 (1961).
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had to have been made at that time or lost completely. After com-
menting that it would not stop to look for actual prejudice, the
Court reversed for absence of counsel. In White v. ilaryland7 the
Court reversed a Maryland decision because it found Maryland's
preliminary hearing a critical stage. The case turned upon a Mary-
land trial procedure allowing the prosecution to comment at trial
upon the defendant's plea at the preliminary hearing. White had
pled guilty at the preliminary hearing but changed his plea to not
guilty at arraignment; at the trial the prosecutor commented upon
White's original plea. The Court again emphasized that it did
not base its decision on a finding of prejudice but
Whatever may be the normal function of the "preliminary
hearing" ... it was in this case as "critical" a stage as arraign-
ment under Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea before
the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had
no counsel.48
There is a general concensus that a proper reading of Hamilton
and White does not result in the requirement of counsel at all pre-
liminary hearings because both involved special circumstances which
created the danger of an unjust result in the absence of counsel.
But courts have had much difficulty developing a test that would
determine when a stage is critical and would require appointment.
The Betts doctrine4 that required reviewing courts to look at the
totality of circumstances to determine whether prejudice to the de-
fendant occurred seems to have been so completely destroyed by
Gideon that it should not be resurrected to deal with this problem.
The Court recognized this implicitly in White when, although
there was clearly actual prejudice present, the Court expressly re-
fused to rest its decision upon the presence of actual prejudice °
Apparently three distinct tests have evolved since White for
determining what is a critical stage.51 (1) Whether lack of counsel
at the pre-trial hearing worked to infect the defendant's subsequent
trial with an absence of that fundamental fairness essential to the
concept of justice. Thus this test looks for actual prejudice. 52 (2)
47 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
48 Id. at 60.
49 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
50 373 U.S. at 60.
51 See Case Note, Criminal Law-Preliminary Hearing: A Critical Stage of Criminal
Proceedings Where Denial of Assistance of Counsel to the Accused Deprives Him of His
Constitutional Right to Counsel, 32 Mo. L. REv. 305, 308-09 (1967).
52 E.g., United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 613 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Whether there was a likelihood of prejudice to the accused because
of the absence of counsel.53 (3) Whether the preliminary hearing
was more than a mere formality; and if so, whether the absence of
counsel could have affected the whole trial. 4 It is noticeable that
these tests answer the question of when counsel must be appointed
in a pre-trial hearing with a due process analysis instead of an equal
protection approach. 5
There seems to be a conceptual difficulty in the application of
due process to the right to counsel in pre-trial hearings. The Su-
preme Court has ruled that due process does not require a prelim-
inary hearingr0 a grand jury investigation, 57 or an arraignment.68
Although the logic behind these decisions seems to be based on
an old fashioned view of due process, these cases have not been over-
ruled. Can due process be used to find a right to counsel in a pre-
trial hearing when such pre-trial hearing is not itself constitutionally
required? In the case law in point judges have assumed due process
can be used. Perhaps the best rationale for this is that, although due
process does not require pre-trial proceedings themselves, due pro-
cess does protect a defendant from that which might prejudicially
affect his trial. Apparently judges have assumed due process can be
used in these situations where the absence of counsel prejudicially
affects the actual trial proceeding and thus the sixth amendment
right to trial. Due process throws a constitutional womb of protec-
tion around the trial proceeding. Absence of counsel prior to trial
affects the rights guaranteed by due process in the trial proceeding.
Counsel's absence after the conviction does not relate back to that
proceeding per se but only relates back to the trial insofar as the
appeal is meant to safeguard the determination of the original trial
court. The absence of counsel prior to trial relates directly forward
to the trial and is thus a clear violation of due process.
Can equal protection supply a stronger rationale for a right
to appointed counsel on pre-trial hearings? A man who can afford
an attorney will obtain one prior to a pre-trial hearing in a case of
any significance. 9 Is the accused's need for obtaining counsel at the
53 E.g., Sigler v. Bird, 354 F.2d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1966).
54 E.g., Harris v. Wilson, 239 F. Supp. 204, 209 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
55 See id. at 211 n.4. However, this case also suggests the possible application of
equal protection.
56 Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
57 Hurtado v. California, 110 US. 516 (1884).
58 Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914).
59 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.20 (Page Supp. 1966); MODEL CODE OF
PpE-ARAIGNMENT PROc EDURE §§ 4.01 (5), 5.07 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
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pre-trial hearing significant enough for the equal protection clause
to require the state to appoint counsel for all defendants who can-
not privately afford an attorney at their pre-trial hearing? To find
the answer it will help to weigh the competing interests of the state
and the individual.
The individual will clearly benefit from an earlier introduction
of an attorney to his case.6 0 The attorney will give him a better idea
of the gravity of the charge brought against him, describe the dif-
ferent proceedings he must undergo, and in general act as a buffer
between the state and the individual at the points of confrontation. 1
As a result of the attorney's earlier introduction into the case, ev-
idence can be preserved while it is still fresh and while there is a
lower risk that witnesses will be unavailable.8 2 Furthermore, the ac-
cused has an obvious interest in avoiding the stigma of a trial, and
an attorney at the preliminary hearing can help establish a lack of
probable cause which would lead to the release of the accused; or,
if probable cause is found, an attorney can help secure a defendant's
pre-trial release on bail. For example, counsel may demand some
respect for the rules of evidence and thus make it more difficult to
show probable cause.6 The preliminary hearing also offers the at-
torney an opportunity for discovery and provides clearer notice of
the prosecution's case. Counsel's earlier entry into the case will
also give him a longer period to research the law, gather the facts
and consider his arguments before trial.04
The state's interest in retaining the status quo is not insignifi-
cant. The primary state interest is the conservation of financial re-
sources against the expense of appointing counsel at an early stage
in the criminal process. This fear of a great financial burden result-
ing from "premature" appointment of counsel may not be as sig-
nificant as it would at first appear. There are two reasons for this:
first, in the absence of waiver, counsel must be appointed at the
trial level in any event; and, second, where counsel is appointed at
60 See E. BROWNELL, LEGAL Am iN THE uNrr STATEs 140.42 (1951).
61 Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police
Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1048 (1964).
62 SPECIAL COmM. OF =lE N.Y.C.B.A. & NAT. LEGAL AD & DEFENDER As'N, EQUAL
JUSTICE FOR THE AccusED 23 (1959).
63 See Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REV.
164, 177-78 (1965).
64 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.. 45, 58-59 (1932), notes the necessity of preparation
by counsel to present an adequate defense.
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the preliminary hearing there would be a certain amount of sav-
ings from an increase in the number of charges dropped by the pro-
secution or the magistrate where probable cause is not found.
Because the finding of an absolute right to counsel at a pre-trial
hearing could require relitigation of all prior convictions, the state
has a substantial interest in preventing this outcome. Relitigation
could be quite costly to the state, and the release of many of the
"criminal element" could be dangerous to society. Recent decisions
suggest, however, that the Court may use a method of prospective
overruling in this type of situation 5 and this would seem an apt
case for it. Arguably prospective overruling would be more accept-
able where a right is based upon equal protection than where it is
based upon due process. Where a right is so fundamental that a
violation of it offends the universal sense of fair play the availability
of relitigation would seem to be almost mandatory."
Representation of counsel at the pre-trial hearing may not be
important after all because this stage is primarily for the benefit
of the defendant, by acting as a check on police power, and is not
intended to serve as a prologue to be fully integrated into the trial
stage. But, if the hearing is really for the benefit of the accused, the
presence of counsel can only help to further the preliminary .hear-
ing's primary function because the individual will be more com-
pletely protected.
Because an attorney can significantly influence both the out-
come of a trial and the procedural methods of reaching that out-
come, equal protection demands the appointment of counsel at
the first stage at which it is administratively feasible to appoint one.
At present, this may be the preliminary hearing.
B. After Conviction
Douglas has decreed that convicted indigent defendants have
the benefit of counsel at their first appeal of right. The equal pro-
05 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966), Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618 (1965).
66 But see Stovall v. Denno, 588 U.S. 293 (1967), which limited to prospective
operation United States v. Wade, 888 U.S. 218 (1967), in which the Court used a due
process approach to require that counsel be present at post-indictment lineups. The
Court in Stovall was careful to state, however, that it remained open to all persons to
show actual prejudice in the totality of the circumstances of pre-trial proceedings. See
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) which limited Miranda, a due process
decision, to almost purely prospective operation while explicitly retaining the availa-
bility to defendants of old case law to overturn convictions.
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tection language in Douglas could be understood to portend an ex-
tension of a right to appointed counsel to other post-conviction
proceedings. 67 Two areas in which the principles of Douglas could
be easily extended are direct appeals and collateral attacks.
In Anders v. California.," the Supreme Court clearly defined
what it means by a right to appointed counsel on appeal. After
Douglas, California followed the practice of appointing counsel for
a first appeal of right in every case. If that counsel found the appeal
to be without merit and notified the court of his conclusion, the
reviewing court would undertake an independent review of the
record. If the court found there was no merit in petitioner's appeal,
it would deny him the further assistance of counsel. The Supreme
Court struck this procedure down and provided that even if counsel
should decide that an appeal has no merit, he must present a brief
embracing all points that might arguably support the appeal before
the appellate court can make an independent review of the record
and decide whether or not to allow counsel for the appeal. Counsel is
thus required to be an active advocate, not merely an amicus curiae.
Clearly, the Court is underlining the importance of counsel on ap-
peal.69 Anders is evidence that the Court is not overly impressed with
the state's attempt to protect its economic interests by avoiding the
cost of appointing counsel where appeal may be frivolous; instead the
Court seeks to insure that an indigent receive as complete a represen-
tation of counsel on his first appeal of right as that of a rich man.
Although Douglas was expressly limited to the first appeal of
right, its theory could easily extend to all direct appeals. The dis-
senting opinion of Justice Harlan in Douglas supports this suggestion.
67 Day, Coming: The Right To Have Assistance of Counsel at All Appellate
Stages, 52 A.B.A.J. 125, 137-38 (1966).
68 386 US. 728 (1967); see also Swenson v. Bosler, 386 US. 258 (1967).
69 Swenson v. Bosler, 386 US. 258 (1967), also accentuates the importance of
counsel on appeal. Here the Court struck down a Missouri procedure whereby appointed
counsel could file a motion for a new trial arguing all possible grounds for reversal,
file a notice of appeal and withdraw from the case. By Missouri law only those grounds
raised in a motion for a new trial could be raised on appeal. Defendant could then
submit this on appeal without the further help of counsel's briefs or oral arguments.
It seems dear this procedure did not provide the assistance of counsel as demanded
by Douglas. But the decision is significant because retained counsel in Missouri have also
used this procedure to bring an appeal for their clients. Gerard, The Right to Counsel
on Appeal in Missouri: A Limited Inquiry Into the Factual and Theoretical Under-
pinnings of Douglas v. California, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q. 463, 466, 468 (1965). The Court,
then, finds counsel so important that there is a violation of equal protection even here
where the procedure provided by Missouri counsel to those who cannot afford counsel
is the same as that often provided for those who can afford counsel.
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What the Court finds constitutionally offensive in California's
procedure bears a striking resemblance to the rules of this Court
and many state courts of last resort on petitions for certiorari
or for leave to appeal filed by indigent defendants pro se ....
The Court distinguishes our review from the present case
on the grounds that the California rule relates to "the first ap-
peal, granted as a matter of right".... But I fail to see the signi-
ficance of this difference. 0
The equal protection test derived from Douglas1 can be applied
by the Court to determine if there is a right to appointed counsel.
Undoubtedly a man with means could obtain counsel to take his case
to any court that would hear it.72 A defendant has as much at stake
on the outcome of a second appeal as he had on the first.1 8 However,
since there may be a presumption of accuracy and fairness of the
decision reached by a trial court and affirmed by a court of appeals,7 4
and since there is no absolute guarantee that the outcome of a second
appeal will be any more "correct" than a prior decision, it could be
found that the interests which are protected by a second appeal are
not significant enough to require appointment of counsel. Further-
more, the Court must seriously consider the difficulties that would
be thrust upon the state by a decision requiring the appointments of
counsel in all levels of the direct appeal. Most significant among these
would be: (1) the practical problem in providing a sufficient number
of attorneys, and (2) the cost incurred either directly or indirectly by
the state. As our legal system makes the adjustment required by
Gideon, Miranda and Douglas the supply of attorneys available to
represent indigent defendants should increase and the cost per client
should decrease. The feasibility of counsel on secondary appeal should
be greater. As individual attorneys carry a case through all its possible
steps justice should be better served because appeals will be handled
by attorneys who are familiar with both the facts of the case and the
70 372 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1963).
71 See text following note 27 supra.
72 In some states the only court for direct review will be the supreme court because
the first appeal of right is to the state supreme court. See, e.g., State v. Staten, 271 NC.
600, 157 S.E.2d 225 (1967).
73 Comment, The Right to Appointed Counsel at Collateral Attack Proceedings,
19 U. MiAMI L. Rxv. 432, 451 (1965).
74 "It bears emphasis, however, that the ordinary processes of trial and appeal are
presumed to result in valid adjudications." Traynor, J., in People v. Shipman, 62 Cal.
2d 226, 232, 397 P.2d 993, 997 (1965). However, this is not to deny that the same concerns
of the defendant are at stake.
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trial court's treatment of them.75 Equal protection would, at least in
the near future, demand the appointment of counsel at all direct
appeals whether they are first or second, of right or discretionary. 6
The competing interests involved in attempting to determine
whether a right to appointed counsel exists in collateral proceedings
are more evenly balanced than on direct appeal. State courts gen-
erally permit three types of collateral appeals: habeas corpus, coram
nobis, and some kind of statutory post-conviction remedyY Some
state statutes provide for appointment of counsel at hearings in post-
conviction attacks.7 The more typical situation is for a state to
declare the right to appointed counsel a matter of discretion in the
hands of the court in which the action is brought.1 9 This result is
75 The public defender's system should supply the continuity not provided by the
appointed counsel system described in Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate
Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783, 788-89 (1961), where new and different counsel
generally handles appeals. See also SPEcIAL Comm. N.Y.CJ3BA. AND THE NArL LEGAL
AM Ass'N, EQUAL JusrICE FoR T=E Accusan 61 (1959) which suggests that every defender
system should provide for continuance of representation on appeal; Commonwealth
ex rel. Firmstone v. Myers, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 69 (Ct. Quarter Sess.), afl'd, 202 Pa. Super.
292, 196 A.2d 209 (1963), which requires appointed counsel to seek the highest appellate
review consistent with trial errors.
76 But cf. Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1965) (a per curiam decision
affirming a denial of appointment of counsel by a state supreme court for appeal to
the United States Supreme Court.)
77 In Ohio, habeas corpus is limited to testing the jurisdiction of the original court
over person and subject matter. OHIo R v. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.21-.24 (Page Supp. 1967)
provide a proceeding to test whether the conviction obtained was in violation of the
United States or Ohio Constitution. Freeman v. Maxwell, 4 Ohio St. 2d 4, 210 N.E.2d
885 (1965).
In Ohio there is no coram nobis proceeding. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St. 2d 175,
180; 226 N.E2d 103, 108 (1967). The writ of coram nobis is traditionally a discretionary
writ granted for consideration of a fact which may change the decision and which wvas
not known at the trial. State v. Randolph, 32 Wis. 2d 1, 144 N.W2d 441 (1966). Al-
though this note does not discuss the federal post-conviction proceedings under 28
U.S.C. 2241 et seq. (1964), federal decisions involving right to counsel in section 2255
actions are cited because of the similarity between such actions and state post convic-
tion procedures. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
78 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-4 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1402 (1956); N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 15-219 (1965); OHIo R V. CODE ANN. § 2953.24 (Page Supp. 1967); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 138-590 (2), (3) (1967). Although these statutory provisions are seemingly worded
in mandatory terms, courts have found some of these provisions to be discretionary in
effect. See, e.g., In re Sowders, 207 N.E.2d 629 (Ind. 1965).
79 We hold that the law in this circuit is that appointment of counsel for
indigents in habeas corpus and section 2255 proceedings rests in the sound dis.
cretion of district courts unless denial would result in fundamental unfairness
impinging on due process rights.
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usually achieved by some combination of a three-pronged reasoning
process: (1) collateral attacks are civil, not criminal actions, and thus
the sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal proceedings does
not inure; 0 (2) the sheer mathematics of appointing counsel in all
such proceedings makes the initial judicial officer the appropriate
agent to weed out unworthy attacks and prevent an undue burden
upon the state or the bar;81 and (3) in some cases of clear injustice, how-
ever, the protection of fundamental rights may require the appoint-
ment of counsel.8 2 An increasing number of appellate courts require
appointment of counsel for indigents whenever a prima facie case is
stated sufficient to merit a hearing on the collateral attack.U These
courts have found a right to appointed counsel in collateral hearings
by piercing through the civil label, finding collateral attacks to be a
substantive part of the criminal process 4 and, therefore, applying
the principles of Douglas and Griffin.
Griffin and its progeny of transcript and filing fee cases seem to
lead to only one conclusion: an indigent must be provided counsel
whenever that indigent is granted a hearing. Griffin granted an abso-
lute right to a transcript or other means of reporting the trial pro-
ceeding 'for use on direct appeal.85 Burns v. Ohio80 extended the
indigent's protection by striking down a filing fee condition for appeal
LaClair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1967). See Ex parle Lott, 168 So.
2d 265 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964); Freeman v. State, 87 Idaho 170, 180-81, 392 P.2d 542, 548
(1964).
80 Barker v. Ohio, 330 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1964); Collins v. Heinze, 217 F,2d 62
(9th CIr. 1954), cert, denied, 849 U.S. 940 (1955); State v. Hizel, 181 Neb. 680, 150 N.W.2d
217 (1967).
81 See McCrary v. State, 241 Ind. 518, 532, 173 N.E.2d 300, 306 (1961); Brine v.
State, 205 A.2d 12 (Me. 1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Firmstone v. Myers, 82 Pa. D. &
C.2d 69 (Ct. Quarter Sess.), aff'd 202 Pa. Super. 292, 196 A.2d 209 (1963).
82 LaClair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1967). The court in LaClair
based its decision to uphold this discretionary rule on a reading of Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). This "special circumstances" application of due process may
be somewhat suspect in light of the Court's non-application of due process in Douglas
and the extinction of Betts v. Brady.
83 People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 281, 397 P.2d 993, 997 (1965); Stahl v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 198 Kan. 628, 625, 426 P.2d 134, 136 (1967) (dictum); Brine v. State,
205 A.2d 12, 15 (Me. 1964); State v. Randolph, 82 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 144 N.W.2d 441, 443
(1966).
84 People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 231, 897 P.2d 993, 996 (1965); Stahl v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 198 Kan. 628, 627-28, 426 P.2d 134, 137-88 (1967).
85 This became apparent in Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214
(1958), which refused to allow trial court discretion over the right to a transcript.
88 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
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to the state supreme court. Smith v. Bennett" and Lane v. Brownss
reached even farther by striking down a filing fee required for a
habeas corpus action in the former and requiring a free trial tran-
script for appeal from a coram nobis hearing in the latter.
These cases could have been explained as attempts by the Court
to guarantee access to the courts to all men.83 But Douglas has shown
that the Court is doing more than providing access for appellate
review; it is trying to provide an adequate appeal by removing those
invidious discriminations previously suffered by the poor in criminal
proceedings. In the preceding transcript and filing fee cases the
expansion of protection has been to collateral attacks. True, the
Court has refused to rule explicitly on right to appointed counsel at
collateral proceedings,90 but there is no escape from the logical con-
clusion these principles compel.
Chief Justice Traynor in People v. Shipman stated:
Since the questions that may be raised on coram nobis are as
crucial as those that may be raised on direct appeal, the Douglas
case precludes our holding that appointment of counsel in
coram nobis proceedings rests solely in the discretion of the
court.9'
The petitioner's interests protected by counsel at a collateral attack
are almost identical to those protected on direct appeal, and they are
significant. A state's interests, however, are more weighty than those
considered on direct appeal. Collateral attacks have the unusual fea-
ture of not being subject to the doctrine of res judicata except with
regard to the specific issues treated; -9 2 so a state may be bombarded by
a large number of petitions, many of which may be frivolous or
repetitious. Thus the number of petitions could make it financially
87 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
88 372 US. 477 (1963).
89 Under an Indiana statute petitioner in Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), could
not have appealed without the transcript which is only given to indigents through the
public defender. See also Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some
Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1963).
90 But see Hollingshead v. Wainwright, 384 US. 31 (1966), where the Supreme
Court in a per curiam decision reversed a Florida decision, which did not grant appoint-
ment of counsel on appeal from a habeas corpus hearing, by merely citing Douglas.
The meanings of the Supreme Court's brief decision is explained in Herzig v. State,
200 So. 2d 632 (Fla. Dist. C. App. 1967).
91 62 Cal. 2d 226, 231, 397 P.2d 993, 996, (1965).
92 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1963); Lipscomb v. United States, 298
F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 US. 853.(1962); Nicholay v. Kill, 161 Kan. 667,
669, 170 P.2d 823, 826 (1946).
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difficult for a state to appoint counsel in every case. But this considera-
tion is counterbalanced; since an attorney could raise all possible
issues, the presence of counsel could cut down the number of peti-
tions and thus add to the finality of the first proceeding by bringing
more issues within the doctrine of res judicata9 5
People v. Shipman limited appointment of counsel to those
persons who presented petitions showing sufficient facts to merit a
hearing.94 The question whether counsel must be provided to aid an
indigent in the drafting of the petition is difficult. It is the nature of
a collateral attack that a hearing need not be granted. The aid of
counsel in drafting a petition would certainly increase the likelihood
that a hearing would be granted. Chief Justice Traynor feared this
would require too many attorneys.95 Perhaps at present this is true
and the better solution would be to allow a very simple petition form
which the prisoner can fill out for himself. 0 Given this limitation,
equal protection seems to demand the extension of the right to
appointed counsel in collateral attacks to all needy persons presenting
a meritorious petition.
C. A Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel
Gideon and Douglas spoke in sweeping language about the in-
digent's right to the assistance of counsel. Nevertheless, they both
concerned felony convictions and neither explicitly designated
whether or not the right to counsel extended to misdemeanants.9 7
Predictably, courts have drawn varied conclusions. They can be
categorized in the following manner: (1) An indigent misdemeanant
93 Comment, The Right to Appointed Counsel at Collateral Attack Proceedings, 19
U. MIAMI L. REv. 432, 453 (1965); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1963).
94 62 Cal. 2d 226, 232, 397 P.2d 993, 997 (1965). Shipman concerned a coram nobls
proceeding but the right to counsel has been extended to all collateral attacks. Note,
The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Collateral .Proceedings in California:
People v. Shipman, 13 U.C.LA. L. REv. 446, 449 n.21 (1966).
95 62 Cal. 2d at 232, 397 P.2d at 997.
96 Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Post-Conviction Collateral Proceedings
in California: People v. Shipman, 13 U.C.LA. L. REv. 446, 453-54 (1966),
97 In Gideon the Court said:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed funda-
mental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. 372 U.S.
at 344 (emphasis added).
In Douglas the Court said:
We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich




has no right to appointed counsel."" (2) An indigent misdemeanant
has a right to appointed counsel when he is charged with a serious
offense.99 (3) An indigent misdemeanant has a right to appointed
counsel unless his offense falls into the classification of a petty offense,
i.e., an offense not punishable by imprisonment of greater than six
months or a fine or greater than five hundred dollars' 0 (4) A mis-
demeanant has a right to counsel in any case which may lead to in-
carceration in a penal institution.' 0' (5) A right to counsel extends to
appeal from a criminal prosecution including criminal prosecutions
for misdemeanors. 0 2
Two Supreme Court decisions are somewhat indicative of the
tenor of the Court's thinking on this matter. Patterson v. Warden"3
was an appeal from a Maryland pre-Gideon decision refusing to ap-
point counsel to a misdemeanant charged with several counts of
carrying a deadly weapon. Maryland then provided counsel only to
an indigent charged with a serious offense and determined the serious-
ness of the offense by a consideration of three factors: the nature
of the offense, the extent of the potential penalty, and the complexity
of the case. 04 Here the maximum potential penalty under any count
was two years. The Supreme Court in a per curiam decision granted
certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consid-
leration in light of Gideon. The Maryland Supreme Court ordered
reversal and remanded for a new trial in conformity with Gideon.0 5
Patterson suggests that counsel must be appointed in at least some
misdemeanor cases.
98 State v. Thomas, 249 La. 742, 190 So. 2d 909 (1966); Cortinez v. Flournoy, 249
La. 742, 190 So. 2d 909, cert. denied, 385 US. 925 (1966).
99 State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 131, 392 P.2d 784, 790 (1964). Compare State v.
Dejoseph, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 624, 634-35, 222 A.2d 752, 759 (App. Div. 1966) with Arbo v.
Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966).
100 18 U.S.C. § 1 (3) (1964). The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 excluded those indi-
gents accused of petty offenses from representation. 18 U.S.C. § S006A (a) (1964). See,
e.g., Florida v. Brinson, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
01 State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. 1967) (based on court supervisory
power rather than Constitution).
102 People v. Mallory, 147 N.W.2d 66, 72-73 (Mich. 1967). There is a suggestion
that violations of village ordinances may not be included. Id. at 73.
103 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
104 Patterson v. State, 227 Md. 194, 196, 175 A.2d 746, 748 (1961).
105 Patterson v. State, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963). By statute Maryland now
provides counsel for all accused except those accused of petty offenses as defined by the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964). Mo. ANN. CoDE RuE 719 (2) (a)
(Supp. 1967). However, even those accused of petty offenses may have counsel ap-
pointed if the trial judge decides conditions demand it. Rule 719 (2) (b).
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In Winters v. Beck,10 a misdemeanant brought a habeas corpus
action seeking reversal of his original conviction for immorality for
which he was imprisoned for thirty days and fined two hundred and
fifty-four dollars, claiming he had been denied appointment of
counsel. The state supreme court denied his petition because Gideon
concerned a felony and, therefore, the court felt a constitutional
right to appointed counsel extended only to those accused of felonies.
.The Supreme Court denied certiorari107 but Justice Stewart wrote a
dissent in which he noted that because Winters was unable to pay his
fine his period of imprisonment under Arkansas law was actually nine
and one-half months, that Winters was denied as effective a trial as
the .presence of counsel would have provided, and that different juris-
dictions have come to different conclusions about the misdemeanant's
right to appointed counsel. Stewart stated that he did not suggest
that Gideon extended to all misdemeanants, but that the decision as
to whom it does extend should not rest upon arbitrary labels. Al-
though it is a truism that no conclusions as to the Court's opinion of
the substantive law can be drawn from a denial of certiorari, 10 8 one
court has suggested that Winters v. Beck shows that Gideon does not
require the states to appoint counsel for misdemeanants.10 D If any-
thing, Winters does show that the Court was not ready to make a
pronouncement on the subject.
But the Court will have to make its decision one day; when it
does, it must consider the demands of due process and equal protec-
tion. The availability of retained counsel to those who can afford it
is clear.110 So the determinative factor in the Court's collective mind
106 289 Ark. 1151, 1152, 397 S.W.2d 864, 365 (1965), cert. denied, 885 U.S. 907 (1966).
107 Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966). The Supreme Court also denied review
in two other cases on this question: Cortinez v. Flournoy, 385 U.S. 925 (1966) (denial
of motion to file petition of habeas corpus); Dejoseph v. Connecticut, 885 U.S. 982
(1966) (denial of certiorari).
108 E.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (Frankfurter
op. on denial of cert.; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401, 403-04 (1931).
But cf. Leet v. Union Pac. R. R., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 613, 155 P.2d 42, 46-47, cert. denied,
'325 U.S. 866 (1945) (California court accepted denial of certiorari as persuasive of
approval).
10 Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 58-59, 226 N.E.2d 777, 781-82 (1967).
The court reasoned that in view of Winters and Harlan's concurring opinion in Gideon
limiting Gideon's extension of a right to appointed counsel to crimes carrying sub.
stantial prison sentences, Gideon could not possibly embrace misdemeanants. Id. at t6,
226 N..2d.at 780-81.
110 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 US. 3, 9-10 (1954) (retained counsel shall be allowed in
any case, at any stage, on any issue of the criminal proceeding. Here, right to retained
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should be the significance of counsel's presence at the trial of a mis-
demeanant. But since Gideon, by removing the special circumstances
test at least from those "offenses which... carry the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence," '' acknowledged the importance of
counsel to the outcome of a trial, the decisive factor in the Court's
consideration of the misdemeanant's right to counsel must be based
upon a thorough analysis of the effect upon the individual of prosecu-
tion for a misdemeanor. The Court must decide to what extent it
values the protection of an individual's liberty (from confinement
and subsequent restrictions) and property (from fines and other
adverse effects on one's income and reputation).
It is dear that the Court cannot allow the distinction, to rest
upon the states' differing use of the term "misdemeanor."1 * How-
ever, the Court may let itself be guided by a series of cases treating
the right to jury trials as guaranteed by article Ill, section 2 of the
Constitution and the sixth amendment." 3 In these cases the court has
often declared that the words "crime and criminal prosecution" were
not intended to include petty offenses, and thus there was no right
to a jury trial. This line of cases could be discarded; it may well be
that counsel is necessary to achieve a fair trial even though a jury
is not. Therefore the words "criminal prosecution" could mean one
counsel on habitual criminal accusation even though defendant waived right to counsel
on charges of housebreaking and larceny). See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S.
570, 572, 596 (1961) (right to be questioned by counsel when presenting unswom state-
ment to jury).
3-- 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
112 Winters v. Beck, 385 US. 907, 908 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting from a denial
of certiorari); Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397, 401 (D. Conn. 1966); State v. Borst,
154 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1967).
In Arkansas a misdemeanor may be punishable by imprisonment for up to three
years. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 41-805 (1964). In Minnesota a misdemeanor is punishable
by a sentence of up to 90 days imprisonment or a fine, but there is also a third classifi-
cation of crime called a gross misdemeanor which is punishable by imprisonment for
up to one year. MINN. STAT. § 609.02 (4) (1964). In Ohio and Tennessee a misdemeanor
is any offense other than those punishable by death or imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary. OnIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.06 (Page 1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-103 (1953). New
Jersey designates most crimes as misdemeanors. For example, kidnapping punishable
by no less than 30 years and up to life imprisonment, forcible rape punishable by 30
years imprisonment, and robbery punishable by 15 years imprisonment are all called
high misdemeanors. Florida v. Brinson, 273 F. Supp. 840, 846 (S.D. Fla. 1967). Eg., N.J.
Ray. STAT. § 2A : 118-1 (1953) (kidnapping).
=1 Dist. of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937); Schick v. United
States, 195 US. 65, 68-70 (1904); Callan v. Wilson, 127 US. 540, 549 (1888).
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thing in a right to jury context and another in a right to counsel.114
And, if so, the Court must still weigh the variables involved.
Three recent state decisions stand out as examples of attempts
by state supreme courts to weigh the variables involved.
In State v. Anderson"15 the defendant appealed from a conviction
for the misdemeanor of attempting to assist the escape of a prisoner
from jail. Defendant claimed a right to the appointment of counsel
at trial; the state supreme court agreed. The court relied on Patterson
for authority, finding that the Supreme Court required the appoint-
ment of counsel for all serious offenses regardless of their label. It
indicated that it would consider the nature of the offense, the extent
of the potential penalty, and the complexity of the case in deter-
mining whether an offense is serious. The Court felt that a potential
punishment of two years in jail and a one thousand dollar fine
merited the classification "serious offense," but it did not devise a
standard for defining serious offenses. The court's decision was based
on what it thought the mandate of the Constitution to be.
In State v. Borst"6 the defendant Borst was charged with the
misdemeanor of knowingly publishing a false statement about a can-
didate to be voted upon. Borst had asked that counsel be appointed
and had been refused. The Minnesota Supreme Court considered the
question in light of recent decisions and found that it could base no
conclusions upon the Federal or state Constitution. Instead it invoked
its "supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice"'17
to declare that counsel should be provided in any case which may
henceforth lead to incarceration in a penal institution. After con-
sidering the cost of this decision to the state the court when on to
say:
We are persuaded that the possible loss of liberty by an
innocent person charged with a misdemeanor, who does not
know how to defend himself, is too sacred a right to be sacri-
ficed on the altar of expedience. Any society that can afford
a professional prosecutor to prosecute tjiis type of crime must
assume the burden of providing adequate defense, to the end
that innocent people will not be convicted without having
facilities available to properly present a defense.118
114 See State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (Minn. 1967) (reasoning that, although
a jury was not necessary for a fair trial, counsel was).
115 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964).
116 278 Minn. -, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
117 278 Minn. - 154 N.W.2d at 894.
118 278 Minn. -, 154 N.W.2d at 894-95.
[Vol. 29
SYMPOSIUM: COUNSEL
The court postponed for later decision the question of the right to
appointed counsel where only loss of property was at stake, but other-
wise quite dearly enunciated a workable standard for the appoint-
ment of counsel.
People v. Mallory119 decided that a misdemeanant had a right to
appointed counsel on appeal. Defendant had been convicted of
receiving and concealing stolen property worth one hundred dollars
and sentenced to a ninety day term in a house of correction. Mallory
is confusing because it involves several concurring opinions without
a majority and involves both statutory and constitutional interpreta-
tion. Two justices reviewed recent decisions giving a misdemeanant
right to counsel at trial level, then refused to adopt the federal petty
offense distinction'2 saying:
Scarcely can it be said, however, that a permissible maxi-
mum sentence of 3 months' imprisonment or $100 fine or both
leaves the offense one to be regarded as so petty as not entitling
the indigent accused to the assistance of counsel. His liberty is
involved and in jeopardy in such case. For this the constitu-
tional right is designed, to insure equality of treatment and
chances for acquittal between the rich who can afford to hire
counsel and the poor who cannot. '
Seemingly this opinion although on its facts limited to appeal could
require appointment of counsel for misdemeanors at trial.
Two other judges said that although the rationale of Douglas
required the appointment of counsel for misdemeanants on appeal
as of right, that rationale did not require appointment of counsel
here on a delayed appeal which, because it was delayed, was discre-
tionary. But the Michigan constitution by the use of the term "in
every criminal prosecution" demanded the provision of counsel to all
misdemeanants on appeal. This opinion would not necessarily extend
the misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel to the trial level. The
second opinion in Mallory seems to agree with the first's dictum that
the right to appointed counsel does not extend to violation of city
ordinances, such as traffic offenses, which are not considered criminal
offenses under the state constitution.
Courts in other states apparently found the Constitutional right
to counsel to extend to most misdemeanants. -2 The New York Court
119 378 Mich. -, 147 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
120 18 U.S.C. § 5006A(b) (1964).
121 378 Mich. -, 147 NAV.2d at 72-73.
22 State v. Blank, 241 Ore. 627, 628, 405 P.2d 375, 374 (1965) (the state conceded
the right to appointment of counsel in a misdemeanor case); Tacoma v. Heater, 67
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of Appeals has found a right to the appointment of counsel by statu-
tory interpretation in a misdemeanor case involving the theft of two
dollars worth of apples and a thirty day sentence with a twenty-five
dollar fine,123 but denied that right in the case of a traffic violation for
which the fine was one thousand and thirty dollars and imprisonment
of forty-two days. 24 Several states had provided appointment of
counsel for the misdemeanant even before Gideon;125 but many
states await a Supreme Court decision before they are willing to
appoint counsel for anyone charged with an offense less than a
felony.12 6
The Supreme Court cannot long continue its reticence even in
the interest of "creative ambiguity"; the scope of the right to ap-
pointed counsel for misdemeanants is in too great a disarray. There
is no reason why both equal protection and due process grounds do
not demand the appointment of counsel in many misdemeanor cases.
Where the line is to be drawn will depend upon a balancing of the
significance of a misdemeanor prosecution against the cost to the
state of providing counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent cases on the right to appointed counsel are numerous,
and traditional attitudes and decisions are being constantly reviewed
and overturned. Decisions such as State v. Borst and People v. Ship-
man are prime examples of the vitality Gideon and Douglas have
breathed into the constitutional guaranty of counsel at criminal
proceedings. The courts may eventually make any distinction be-
tween the right to counsel and the right to appointed counsel mean.
Wash. 2d 733, 736, 409 P.2d 867, 869 (1966) (the court found that Gideon made no
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors and therefore the right to counsel
extended to both). However, neither case directly involves the right to appointment of
counsel.
123 People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 NX.2d 358 (1965).
124 People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 NYE.2d 670 (1965). Perhaps the following
phrase explains this discrepancy: "Assigning counsel in but 1% of these millions of
cases [traffic violations] could require the services of nearly halE the attorneys registered
in the State." Id. at 312, 213 N.E2d at 672.
125 People v. Agnew, 114 Cal. App. 2d 841, 844-45, 250 P.2d 369, 571 (1952)
(lewdness). The court looked at a totality of the circumstances to find a right to ap.
pointed counsel. Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 294, 300.03, 98 N.E.2d 250, 253.54 (1951)
(child neglect); Hunter v. State, 288 P.2d 425, 428 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955) (traffic
violation).
126 Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1965); Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio
App. 2d 51, 60-61, 226 N.E.2d 777, 783 (1967).
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ingless in criminal proceedings. But too rapid a change could cause
grave disruption of our legal system. A judicial approach which will
allow an evolution of decisions is necessary.
Both due process and equal protection must be considered in
any attempt to discover the limits of the right to counsel. An equal
protection test which demands balancing of the interests of the
individual and the interests of the state offers a framework for a
flexible judicial approach. In Douglas and Griffin the Court has
adopted a test which fosters this flexibility. A court must find a dis-
crimination resulting from a state procedure and must then deter-
mine whether that discrimination is significant enough to come
within the purview of equal protection. This test requires courts to
make a decision on the underlying merits and therefore insures that
equal protection will be applied in a responsible manner. Yet the
test allows the courts more freedom from the impediments of early
due process decisions. The application of equal protection to pre-
trial hearings and post-conviction proceedings is not complicated by
early decisions that due process requires neither. Due process may be
limited by the Bill of Rights or by fundamental fairness. The unfair-
ness resulting from some misdemeanor trials in which counsel was
absent may not be protected by the Bill of Rights or fundamental
fairness; but it may be significant enough to generate the application
of equal protection. Equal protection can thus reach further than
due process. The rationale of Douglas and Griffin offers an op-
portunity for the courts to demand that our system of criminal
justice provide equal justice for all.
Lawrence 0. Eitzen
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